In the dispute between influencers Shurjoka and Tobias Huch, the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt has ruled that not every public dispute is a case for competition law. While defamatory statements of fact were prohibited, the court allowed polemical statements of opinion such as “Hatefluencerin”.
Pia Scholz, known as “Shurjoka”, and Tobias Huch argued in court about the admissibility of some of Huch’s statements. As a result, some of Huch’s statements were categorised as infringing personal rights and prohibited. Others, however – such as the description of Shurjoka as a “Hatefluencer ” – were classified as value judgements covered by freedom of expression by the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt in its judgement of 17 July 2025 (case no. 16 U 80/24). However, the court completely denied claims for injunctive relief under competition law because there was no competitive relationship between the two “influencers” and Huch’s statements could not be regarded as commercial behaviour. The lto also reported.
Shurjoka had sued Huch for injunctive relief against various disparaging statements. The 16th Civil Senate (responsible for press law) clarified that untrue statements of fact are not protected by the fundamental right to freedom of expression, but that judgemental statements of opinion are. Accordingly, Huch was prohibited from claiming that Shurjoka “incites hatred on a daily basis” and that it is her business model to “spread this hatred and this fake news“, or that she accuses others of sexually harassing her – because these are not proven true facts. Such defamatory allegations violate Scholz’s general right to privacy and must be refrained from.
Shurjoka, on the other hand, had to accept polemical value judgements such as the statement that she was only suing Huch “because she doesn’t like what I say about her”, as well as the claim that she exhibits “mysogenic behaviour” and, in particular, the description of her as a “hatefluencer”. The court considered such statements to be covered by freedom of expression, as they were primarily subjective judgements and criticism. In this respect, Huch’s right to freedom of expression was successful. So far so good. Whether there were sufficient connecting facts for these value judgements will perhaps be revealed in any main proceedings.
No UWG claims: No competitive relationship and no commercial act
In addition to violations of personal rights, Shurjoka had also asserted claims for injunctive relief under the Unfair Competition Act ( UWG ). A stricter standard for freedom of expression regularly applies here because the commercial nature is obvious. However, these failed completely. The court denied a concrete competitive relationship between the parties. Although both parties are active in the streaming market in the broadest sense, the fact that they are in the same industry does not make them competitors within the meaning of the UWG. For a competitive relationship to exist, they would have to be in a concrete sales or audience competition – which the Senate did not consider to be the case here.
The Senate cited several reasons why neither the requirements of a competitive relationship nor a commercial act were met:
- Different business orientations: Huch had not advertised its own or third-party goods or services in the YouTube videos complained of. Instead of advertising products, he depicted the dispute with Shurjoka, commented on it and asked for donations for his legal fees. His statements were therefore not intended to promote sales, but had an informative/entertaining function.
- No zero-sum competition: It was neither shown nor apparent that an advantage for one party would simultaneously mean a disadvantage for the other. On the contrary – the public dispute is likely to have increased the reach (click figures) of both influencers. Neither party was fighting for market share at the expense of the other; both benefited from the attention.
- Limited commerciality of the plaintiff: In addition, Shurjoka herself stated that she supported herself financially through gaming streams and the rest of her content on a quasi “voluntary” basis She did not act commercially with a large part of her content, which also speaks against the applicability of the UWG.
- Statements were made in a business context: Huch’s statements complained of did not constitute commercial acts They did not serve to promote the sale of goods or services, but had an information and entertainment function in the context of editorial content. There was no advertising surplus – the statements were essentially part of a public debate, not part of a marketing or business operation.
Conclusion
The decision (judgement of 17.07.2025, ref. 16 U 80/24) makes it clear that not every public exchange of blows between “influencers” can be classified as competition in the legal sense. However, the use of the term may already be misleading, as the “job description” of an influencer usually has a commercial dimension, for example through advertising, product placements or collaborations with brands. Personal rights limits for statements can be exceeded (in which case injunctions may be issued), but competition law only applies if the parties involved are actually competing for an economic audience or business. Mere range disputes or mutual criticism between two content creators do not constitute a competitive relationship within the meaning of the UWG.
In its decision Influencer I of 9 September 2021 – I ZR 90/20, the Federal Court of Justice had already commented on the conditions under which an influencer’s post on social media contains a promotional surplus necessary for the assumption of a commercial act in favour of another company. This must be assessed on the basis of a comprehensive assessment of all the circumstances of the individual case, taking into account the interaction of the design features (e.g. posted product photos, editorial context, links to third-party company websites).