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Software today consists of numerous components and dependencies. A Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) creates transparency, facilitates vulnerability management and is becoming increasingly important from a legal perspective as a result of the Cyber Resilience Act and NIS-2. For many companies, this gives rise to new legal requirements – and the need to integrate SBOMs into processes and contracts in a legally compliant manner.

Nowadays, software is rarely developed entirely ‘in-house’. In practice, developers rely on open-source libraries, frameworks, third-party components, data repositories, containers and other building blocks. Whilst this is significantly more efficient than writing every line of code from scratch, However, it also makes software development more complex. If you do not know which components are contained within a product, it is often difficult to identify and assess security vulnerabilities. In the worst-case scenario, it may even go unnoticed that a piece of software is affected by a security vulnerability – and no action is taken.

Legislators have recognised this problem and responded with corresponding catalogues of measures in the CRA and NIS-2. Among other things, the mandatory measures are intended to ensure greater transparency and control within the supply chain. This is precisely where the so-called Software Bill of Materials, or SBOM for short, comes into play.

What is an SBOM?

Put simply, an SBOM is a list of ingredients for software. It documents which components a piece of software consists of and what dependencies exist between these components. The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) describes an SBOM as a machine-readable document that catalogues a codebase and contains information about the components used.

At a minimum, the following should be recorded:

  • the manufacturer or supplier of a component,
  • the name and version of the component,
  • the actual file name,
  • dependencies on other components,
  • licence information,
  • hash values, and
  • properties of the component, such as whether it is executable, constitutes an archive or contains structured data.

The key point is that an SBOM should be machine-readable so that it can be analysed automatically. This enables organisations to determine more quickly whether a particular vulnerability affects their software. To ensure interoperability and the efficient use of the SBOM, the BSI recommends using established standards such as ‘CycloneDX’ or ‘SPDX’. Formal and technical requirements for SBOMs are set out in Technical Guideline TR-03183-2.

SBOM and the Cyber Resilience Act

The SBOM takes on particular relevance as a result of the Cyber Resilience Act. The Act came into force on 10 December 2024 and will generally apply from 11 December 2027. Certain provisions apply earlier, in particular those concerning the notification of conformity assessment bodies from 11 June 2026 and certain reporting obligations from 11 September 2026. The Regulation thus establishes, for the first time, a uniform, EU-wide horizontal legal framework for cybersecurity requirements applicable to products containing digital elements.

The CRA obliges manufacturers to take cybersecurity into account throughout a product’s entire life cycle. This includes not only requirements for secure development, but also the management of vulnerabilities after the product has been placed on the market.

The SBOM plays a central role in this. According to Annex I, Part II, No. 1 of the CRA, manufacturers must identify and document vulnerabilities and components of their products, including by creating an SBOM in a commonly used machine-readable format. The SBOM must, at a minimum, list the product’s top-level dependencies. Direct dependencies must therefore be recorded in all cases. According to the wording of the regulation, a complete mapping of all deeper-level dependencies is not strictly required.

It is important to note that the SBOM does not necessarily have to be made publicly available. It may contain sensitive information about the architecture, dependencies or security status of a product. Publication could therefore compromise trade and business secrets as well as security interests. However, manufacturers must be able to provide the SBOM upon a reasoned request from the market surveillance authority, insofar as this is necessary to verify compliance with the cybersecurity requirements.

SBOM and NIS-2

The SBOM is also gaining in importance within the framework of the NIS 2 Directive, even though it is not explicitly mentioned there as a mandatory individual measure. Under the Act implementing the NIS 2 Directive, which came into force on 6 December 2025, affected organisations must implement appropriate risk management measures in the field of cybersecurity. In addition to other operational aspects, these measures relate in particular to supply chain security.

An SBOM can be a useful building block for the practical implementation of the NIS 2 requirements set out in Section 30 of the BSIG. It helps to provide an overview of the software components and dependencies in use, to better assess risks in the supply chain, and to enable a faster response to security incidents.

Particularly for organisations that purchase, develop or use software in critical business processes, it may be advisable in future to incorporate SBOMs into their contracts. It is conceivable, for example, to include SBOM obligations towards service providers in service-level agreements. This could mean that even companies not covered by the NIS 2 Directive’s scope of application might be obliged to implement measures such as the creation and maintenance of an SBOM.

No SBOM, no consequences?

The absence of an SBOM does not automatically constitute a breach of the law. However, for manufacturers of products containing digital elements, an SBOM will regularly become an important part of compliance under the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA): according to Annex I, Part II, No. 1 of the CRA, they must identify and document components and vulnerabilities: An SBOM therefore becomes mandatory within the scope of the CRA.

The decisive factor is not merely whether a file labelled ‘SBOM’ exists. Rather, what matters is whether the manufacturer has recorded the components and dependencies of their product in a traceable manner and fulfilled their obligations regarding vulnerability management. In particular, a missing or incomplete SBOM may result in the technical documentation being incomplete or the product’s conformity being unable to be demonstrated. The market surveillance authority may then require the non-conformity to be rectified. If this is not done, restrictions or a ban on making the product available on the market, as well as a withdrawal or recall, may be considered, in particular under Articles 53, 54 and 58 of the CRA.

Furthermore, Article 64 of the CRA provides for fines of up to EUR 15,000,000 or up to 2.5 per cent of global annual turnover for breaches of the essential cybersecurity requirements and the manufacturer’s obligations under Articles 13 and 14 of the CRA. The specific sanction depends on the circumstances of the individual case, in particular the severity and duration of the breach, its consequences and the size of the company.

The CRA will, in principle, apply from 11 December 2027. The reporting obligations for actively exploited vulnerabilities and serious security incidents will apply from 11 September 2026. For products placed on the market before 11 December 2027, the remaining CRA requirements generally apply only in the event of a substantial change; however, the reporting obligations under Article 14 of the CRA also apply to these products.

Under NIS-2, on the other hand, an SBOM is not prescribed as a standalone obligation for every affected organisation. Section 30 of the BSIG does, however, require appropriate, proportionate and effective risk management measures, in particular with regard to supply chain security, as well as the procurement, development and maintenance of information technology systems and vulnerability management. Depending on the risk profile, an SBOM may therefore be necessary to implement and document these obligations appropriately. Whether its absence has legal consequences depends, in particular, on whether the company is a manufacturer, importer or user of an affected product, what risks exist, and whether the SBOM has been contractually guaranteed.

Our advice: Companies should clarify at an early stage whether they are directly subject to the CRA, which components their products contain, and how SBOMs can be integrated into development processes, vulnerability management and supplier contracts. A timely review not only reduces the risk of sanctions but also provides robust evidence for customers, authorities and business partners.

Contractual and civil law consequences

Irrespective of sanctions under public law, the absence of an SBOM may also have contractual consequences. If its creation, updating or provision is agreed in a contract, a service-level agreement or a technical specification, failure to provide it generally constitutes a breach of duty. Depending on the type of contract and the significance of the matter, remedies such as subsequent performance, rights of retention, reduction in price, damages, reimbursement of wasted expenditure and – following an unsuccessful setting of a deadline and where the matter is of sufficient importance – withdrawal or termination may be considered. The relevant provisions are, in particular, Sections 280, 281, 323 and 634 of the German Civil Code (BGB); in the case of a contract for work and services, Section 634 BGB refers to the rights in respect of defects set out therein.

However, a claim for damages generally requires that specific damage has been incurred, that the breach of duty is attributable to the party at fault, and that the absence of the SBOM was the cause of the damage (Section 280(1) of the BGB). This may be the case, for example, if a known vulnerability is not detected and rectified in good time due to a lack of component information, thereby incurring costs for incident response, business interruptions or the procurement of replacement equipment. The mere absence of an SBOM, on the other hand, does not automatically give rise to a claim for damages.

It is therefore advisable for suppliers and customers to set out SBOM obligations specifically in their contracts: Which components and dependencies must be recorded? In what format and at what intervals must the SBOM be updated? Who is authorised to access it, and within what timeframe must it be disclosed in the event of a vulnerability or upon request by the authorities? Clear regulations provide legal certainty and make it easier to enforce claims in the event of a disruption.

What companies should do now

An SBOM is not an end in itself, but a practical tool for making responsibility for one’s own software and its supply chain transparent and verifiable. For manufacturers of digital products, the Cyber Resilience Act will make it an essential part of technical documentation and vulnerability management. For organisations covered by NIS-2, it can – depending on their individual risk profile – help to manage supply chain and vulnerability risks appropriately and to document the measures taken. Furthermore, clearly defined contractual SBOM obligations create reliable expectations between suppliers, service providers and customers.

Companies should therefore not wait until a regulatory authority, a customer or a security incident raises the question of which components are being used. Those who define responsibilities, processes and contractual standards at an early stage create robust transparency and can assess security vulnerabilities more quickly. We support companies in understanding their CRA and NIS 2 obligations, as well as in designing SBOM processes and contractual clauses in a legally compliant manner.

The fact that the SBOM is developing into a global minimum standard for cyber security is made clear, amongst other things, by the recently published ‘SBOM for AI’ guideline. These guidelines were drawn up by a working group comprising the cybersecurity authorities of the G7 countries with the aim of extending the benefits of an SBOM to the field of artificial intelligence.