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The Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection’s (BMJV) efforts to improve criminal law protection against ‘digital violence’ and to facilitate law enforcement are driven by a legitimate concern. Nevertheless, the draft bill drawn up for this purpose in April contained significant shortcomings. Unfortunately, the government draft that has since been published fails to address the valid criticism raised by the German Bar Association (DAV), to which Prof. Niko Härting contributed.

In May 2026, the DAV issued a statement on the recently drafted ‘Ministry’s draft bill on strengthening civil and criminal law protection against digital violence’ – in short: the ‘Law against Digital Violence’ (GgdG). In addition to numerous shortcomings in criminal law, the DAV criticised the civil law provisions in particular.

Insufficient restriction of the right to information under Section 2 of the GgdG-E

A key point of criticism concerned the proposed right to information. Under Section 2(1) of the GgdG-E, service providers are to be obliged to provide affected individuals with information about stored data. According to Section 2(2) of the GgdG-E, this right covers both subscriber data and traffic data. The DAV rightly criticised the fact that the obligation to provide information is made dependent solely on whether the information is necessary for the enforcement of civil law claims. In particular, the draft lacks a restriction linked to the severity of the underlying legal infringement. This does not do justice to the intensity of the interference associated with the disclosure of traffic data and the resulting infringement of the secrecy of telecommunications under Article 10(1) of the Basic Law (DAV Opinion 38/2026, p. 14).

However, the Government’s draft amends Section 2 of the GgdG-E only in specific respects. For instance, paragraph 1 clarifies that the court order must cover not only the admissibility but also the scope of the information to be provided. In paragraph 2, the word ‘regularly’ is added in connection with the data required for the request for information. Furthermore, the term ‘telephone number’ is replaced by ‘call number’. Under the newly inserted paragraph 5, the obligation to submit a copy of the contested content pursuant to paragraph 2(3) shall not apply if the content in question is such that its possession is a criminal offence, irrespective of any intention to use or facilitate its use. The main point of criticism in the opinion – the lack of a genuine threshold for intervention – remains unaddressed, however.

Unresolved criticism of the account suspension under Section 4 of the GgdG-E

The account suspension provided for in Section 4 of the GgdG-E also drew criticism from the DAV. The DAV expressed considerable doubts as to its compatibility with Article 23(1) of the Digital Services Act (DSA). As the DSA aims for full harmonisation, national regulations should not cover the same subject matter in parallel with the requirements of EU law. Furthermore, the concepts of ‘infringement’ in Section 4 of the GgdG-E and ‘illegal content’ in Article 23(1) of the DSA are not necessarily identical. A parallel national provision therefore risks undermining the factual assessments laid down under EU law (DAV Opinion 38/2026, p. 16).

Furthermore, the DAV also criticised the design of the account suspension as such. This inevitably leads to lawful content on the account in question being blocked at the same time. Furthermore, as the most severe form of interference with the account holder’s rights, it may, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, only be ordered as a last resort. However, the draft bill does not provide for sufficiently differentiated alternative measures to be taken prior to an account suspension. The merely general reference to the consideration of a less severe form of content moderation in Section 4(3) of the GgdG-E does not satisfy these requirements (DAV Opinion 38/2026, p. 16).

The government’s draft does, however, make some amendments to Section 4 of the GgdG-E. For instance, the heading of the provision has already been changed from ‘Suspension of user accounts on social networks’ to ‘Right to suspension and removal against social networks’. This takes account of the fact that the government’s draft provides, in a new paragraph 5, for a separate right to the removal of unlawful content. Unlike under the previous version, the removal of content is no longer to be ordered mandatorily in conjunction with the suspension of the account. Rather, it is now structured as a separate right, the grounds for which require that the infringement committed by the user infringes upon the affected party’s personal rights. At the same time, the government’s draft makes it clear that Article 16(1) of the DSA remains unaffected.

However, this does not address the DAV’s main points of criticism. In particular, the question of the compatibility of the national account suspension with Article 23(1) of the DSA remains unanswered. The government draft also retains the fundamentally undifferentiated nature of the account suspension and the lack of sufficiently graduated, less severe measures. It is noteworthy, however, that the newly introduced right to removal now explicitly aligns its legal consequence with the terminology of the DSA: Whilst Section 4(5) of the GgdG-E continues to require a ‘legal infringement’ as an element of the offence, the legal consequence now focuses on the removal of ‘unlawful content’. Why this terminological alignment with the DSA applies solely to the legal consequence and not also to the elements of the offence, however, remains unclear.

Unlawful circumvention of the requirement to be represented by a solicitor under Section 7 of the GgdG-E

Finally, the DAV criticised the provision in Section 7 of the GgdG-E allowing civil society organisations to represent parties before the regional courts. There is no justification for such preferential treatment. Unlike lawyers, NGOs generally lack litigation experience and are bound by law neither to confidentiality nor to independence. Nor does the prohibition on conflicts of interest apply to them. A two-tier system before the regional courts should therefore be rejected. In particular, civil society organisations must not be established as a cost-effective alternative to the legal profession (DAV Statement 38/2026, p. 16).

The government bill adopts the provisions of the draft bill almost unchanged. Only the scope of application is clarified in terms of wording: whilst the draft bill refers generally to ‘proceedings under this Act’, the government bill expressly limits the possibility of representation to ‘court proceedings under this Act’. Furthermore, the requirement regarding the organisation’s statutory tasks has been amended. These are now to be directed towards safeguarding the interests of individuals whose personal rights are infringed in the digital sphere. The previous restriction to the interests of ‘internet users’ is thus removed. On the substance of the matter, however, the government’s draft does not address the DAV’s criticisms. In particular, the possibility of representation by civil society organisations remains in place, without the differences – which the DAV has criticised – from the professional requirements applicable to the legal profession being eliminated. The DAV’s fundamental concerns therefore remain.